

# Enhancing Security of Linux-based Android Devices

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  - Next Generation Services
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  - Cognitive Architectures
  - Education
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- Agent Security
- Network Security Simulation
- Critical Infrastructures
- PKI / Cryptography
- Next Generation Homes Security

#### TOC



- Motivation
- Android Security
- Adding Linux Security Tools to Android
- Enhancing Security with self-built IDS

#### Motivation



- Smartphones getting increasingly popular
- Various smartphone malwares appeared
- Signature-based approaches only efficient for "known" malware
- Anti-Virus engines need avg. time of 48 days to get capable of detecting new malware [Oberheide08]
- More than 700,000 can be infected via MMS in about three hours [Bulygin07]

#### Motivation



- Android already very popular (Java on Linux)
- Android sources will be set open-source
  - Opportunity to develop low-level security tools for commonly used smartphones the first time
- Linux security research is mature
  - A lot lessons learned
  - A lot of open source tools available

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- Images on emulator
  - System Image (YAFFS2, 65 MB / 21 MB free)
    - Mounted to /system
    - OS files, libraries, drivers, system bins
    - Android config files
    - Android framework
    - Android base applications (e.g. Browser)
    - -+R(W)X



- Images on emulator
  - Userdata Image (YAFFS2, 65 MB / 40 MB free)
    - Mounted to /data
    - Used for applications, user data, DRM, ...
    - +RWX
  - Cache Image (YAFFS2, usage not specified yet)
  - SD-Card Image (no "obvious" size limitations)
    - Mounted to /sdcard
    - Files created as user and group "system"
    - +RW



- Applications are "location-aware"
  - Can only be executed in /data or /system
  - Any changes on file permissions succeed there
  - Changes in e.g. /sdcard do not succeed (e.g. set execute bit)
  - Most probably, (Linux) applications cannot be started via SD-Card



- (Java) Application signing is required
  - Linux state not clear
  - developer signs his application with own certificate at the moment
  - System might change to something similar to Symbian OS
    - Central authority for assigning certificates
    - Limited access to APIs
    - Each, Goole and T-Mobile announced application store (might include application testing and verification)



- File rights:
  - | /data/data/<package.application\_name>
  - "application land"
  - drwxr-xr-x app\_14 app\_14 2008-09-17 14:26 com.android.sample
- Application can access other application directories signed with identical certificates
  - "Certification land"

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## Adding Linux Security Tools to Android General Information



- Emulator is used as basis
- OHA/Google modified a lot of standard libraries and binaries
  - Reason: opportunity for business costumers to claim "intellectual property"
- Application space is limited (~40 MB)
- Common security tools were tested
  - But: special build environment needed

#### Creating a Build Environment for Android



- Ubuntu 8.04
- Two toolkits can be used
  - Sourcery cross-compile toolchain
  - Scratchbox cross-compilation toolkit
    - Emulated ARM environment
    - "Common" Linux file system layout

## Creating a Build Environment for Android Important Facts



- Files are located in:
  - System files are placed in /system
  - Binaries in /system/bin
  - Libraries in /system/lib
  - Config files in /system/etc
- System configuration in OpenBinder
- Page alignment causes changes in linking
- Only way to get available applications run is compiling them statically

## Adding Tools



- "Top 100 Network Security Tools" [Insec06]
- Tested from 5 main categories:
  - Anti-Virus: ClamAV
  - Firewall: iptables
  - Rootkit Detectors: chkrootkit
  - Intrusion Detection: Snort
  - Other useful tools: Busybox, Bash, OpenSSH, strace, Nmap

#### Anti-Virus: ClamAV



- Android Compatibility: Works
- Problems, solutions, and size:
  - Static compilation (linking) required
  - Dependent on static compiled version of "zlib" (zlib-1.2.3)
  - Total size of all ClamAV relevant files (approx. 28MB) exceeds available size in System image
  - (21MB). ClamAV virus signature database needs to be placed in a different location.
  - Size (approx.): 11140 KB libraries and binaries (/opt), 17324 KB database (/data)

#### Anti-Virus: ClamAV Results



```
----- SCAN SUMMARY
Known viruses: 407205
Engine version: 0.94
Scanned directories: 0
Scanned files: 106
Infected files: 0
Data scanned: 5.12 MB
Time: 107.236 sec (1 m 47 s)
#
```

## Firewall: iptables



#### Problems:

- Kernel needs to be recompiled from source. Sources can be freely downloaded from Android Project website. Enable NETFILTER in kernel configuration and recompile!
- "iptables" cannot be compiled due to linker issues: It requires statically compiled parts of libc which Android does not provide.

#### Rootkit Detector: Chkrootkit



- Android Compatibility: Works with minor dependencies
- Problems, solutions, and size:
  - Static compilation (linking) required
  - Requires "netstat" (provided by "busybox")
  - Requires standard directories (/lib, /etc, etc.)
     provided by symbolic links pointing to the correct
     Android directories
  - Size (approx.): 588 KB

#### Rootkit Detector: Chkrootkit Results



```
# ./chkrootkit
[: gid: unknown operand
ROOTDIR is \'/'
Checking `amd'... not found
Checking `basename'... INFECTED
Checking `biff'... not found
Checking `cron'... not infected
Checking `echo'... INFECTED
Checking `egrep'... not infected
Checking `env'... INFECTED
Checking `find'... not infected
Searching for common ssh-scanners default files... nothing found
Searching for suspect PHP files... find: /var/tmp: No such file or
directory
nothing found
Searching for anomalies in shell history files... nothing found
chkproc: Warning: Possible LKM Trojan installed
chkdirs: Warning: Possible LKM Trojan installed
Checking `sniffer'..../chkrootkit: ./ifpromisc: not found
```

#### Intrusion Detection: Snort



#### Problems:

- Dependencies to libpcap, libdnet, libnet, pcre and iptables (all as statically compiled/linked solutions)
- Requires statically compiled/linked libc parts which are not available on Android

## Other Useful Tools: Busybox, Bash, OpenSSH, strace, Nmap





- Busybox: works
- Bash: works
- OpenSSH: Can be executed but is not fully functional (requires users that do not exist in the android environment)
- strace: works
- Nmap: works with minor dependencies

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## Detecting Intrusions and Malware Static Function Call Approach



- Planned to present metric for weighing suspiciousness of function/system calls
- Solution far more easier on Android
- Simple decision tree can achieve 95% detection rate
  - Tested with Linux malware
    - Some of them were recompiled for Android, but only minor differences
- Still has to be tested on real device!

## Detecting Intrusions and Malware Static Function Decision Tree



```
_bss__start = y
                                       ... continued
  gethostbyname = y
    sigaction = y: normal
                                          bss start = n
    sigaction = n: malicious
                                          printf = y: malicious
  gethostbyname = n
                                          printf = n
    fork = y
                                             fprintf = y: malicious
       strerror = y
                                             fprintf = n
          getgrgid = y: malicious
                                                 execv = y: malicious
          getgrgid = n: normal
                                                 execv = n
       strerror = n: malicious
                                                    memmove = y: malicious
    fork = n: normal
                                                    memmove = n
                                                       perror = y: malicious
continued on the right side
                                                       perror = n: malicious
```

## Summary



- Android Security
- How to enhance security
  - Add Linux security tools
  - Light weight IDS

#### References



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# Thank you for your patience! Q&A

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